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CREATING BALANCE: PROBLEMS WITHIN DSHEA
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Jennifer Akre Hill*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994
(DSHEA) was signed into law on October 25, 1994.' At the signing,
President Clinton endorsed the "intense efforts" of manufacturers
and legislators to change the "treatment of dietary supplements un-
der regulation and law."2 Further, the bill was signed with the hope
that it would benefit consumers by permitting more access to dietary
supplements and more choices for consumer directed healthcare.'
* Jennifer Akre Hill is a May 2007 Juris Doctor candidate at the University of
Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville, Arkansas. This Comment received the Univer-
sity of Arkansas Journal of Food Law & Policy's 2006 Annual Arent Fox/Dale
Bumpers Excellence in Writing Award. The author would like to thank her faculty
advisor, Adjunct Professor Michael Roberts, an attorney with Venable LLP in Wash-
ington, D.C., for his guidance and support in preparation of this comment. The
author would also like to thank 2005-06 Note and Comment Editor Jeffrey D.
Wood, J.D. 2006, for his encouragement and guidance through the writing process.
1. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA), Pub. L.
No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325, [hereinafter DSHEA] (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000)).
2. President William J. Clinton, statement at the signing of S. 784, Oct. 25,
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3523-1 (1994). Congressional findings revealed improving the
health status of citizens ranks at the top of the nation's priorities, and that there is a
link between the ingestion of certain nutrients or dietary supplements and the pre-
vention of chronic disease. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act § 2.
Therefore, there is a growing need for dissemination of information linking nutri-
tion with good health. Id.
3. Clinton, supra note 2 (stating further, "[i]n recent years, the regulatory
scheme designed to promote the interests of consumers and a healthful supply of
good food has been used instead to complicate choices consumers have made to
advance their nutritional and dietary goals"); see also Scott Bass & Emily Marden,
The New Dietary Ingredient Safety Provision of DSHEA: A Return to Congressional Intent,
31 AM.J.L. & MED. 285, 287 (2005) (noting DSHEA was premised on the positive
role of nutrition in preventative health care and supported by the recognition that
consumers want information and access to a "broad range of safe products").
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In support, politicians on both sides of the aisle claimed the DSHEA
as a victory for consumer freedom, populist protection, and preven-
tative medicine.'
The sweeping legislation of the DSHEA leaves its mark on three
influential groups: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an
agency that serves to protect Americans from adulterated, mis-
branded, and dangerous food and drug products;5 the dietary sup-
plement industry, represented by the manufacturers, producers, and
retailers of dietary supplements;6 and the dietary supplement con-
suming public. While creating the DSHEA, Congress attempted to
meet the needs of each of the three groups by striking a balance
between unfettered access and strict control.!
Whether or not that balance exists depends on who is looking
at the scale. Specifically, the DSHEA does supply "control" of dietary
supplements, but only so far as it has provided the FDA with a regu-
latory mechanism to monitor post-manufacturing product safety.8
Increased access was also granted; DSHEA regulation "supersede[d]
the [existing] ad hoc patchwork regulatory policy on dietary sup-
plements"9 and successfully removed the regulatory barriers that
limited the flow of information and products to consumers."0 In the
end, however, DSHEA accomplished more than a barrier removal; it
"yielded significant latitude to dietary supplement companies in
manufacturing and promoting their products."
n
Since the passage of DSHEA, more consumers have gained ac-
cess to dietary supplements as they have become available through
new venues such as grocery stores and the internet." This apparent
4. Michael A. McCann, Dietary Supplement Labeling: Cognitive Biases, Market
Manipulation, and Consumer Choice, 31 AM.J.L. & MED. 215, 246-47 (2005).
5. FDA, FDA's Mission Statement, http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/
mission.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006) (indicating that the FDA is responsible for
protecting, among other things, the public health by assuring the safety, efficacy,
and security of human drugs, biological products, medical devices, and the food
supply).
6. See generally Iona Kaiser, Dietary Supplements: Can the Law Control the Hype?,
37 Hous. L. REV. 1249 (2000).
7. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, supra note 1, 3.3 § 2.
8. Morgan J. Wais, Comment, Stomaching the Burden of Dietary Supplement Safety:
The Need to Shift the Burden of Proof Under the Dietary Supplement Health and Education
Act of 1994, 28 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 849, 878 (2005).
9. See infra Part II (discussing the regulatory framework prior to DSHEA).
10. McCann, supra note 4, at 243.
11. Id.
12. Joseph A. Levitt, Regulation of Dietary Supplements: FDA's Strategic Plan, 57
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 1 (2002).
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success in improving access to dietary supplements, however, must
be weighed against the side effects. Access to dietary supplements
has not only grown, it has changed. Where at one time adult con-
sumers were buying products from specialized health stores," chil-
dren and adolescents now have equally ready access to dietary sup-
plements.'4 The side effects of the increased access are com-
pounded further because DSHEA allows dietary supplement prod-
ucts to reach the consuming public with no pre-market evaluation 5
providing children with access to products that are often the equiva-
lent of diluted drugs. 6
By decisively removing regulatory barriers in order to increase
consumer access to dietary supplements, the DSHEA created an
atmosphere that allowed the dietary supplement industry to de-
velop. 7 Yet, the DSHEA failed to provide a framework for regulat-
ing the changing market or to give the FDA enough regulatory
power to protect consumer safety in the changing marketplace."
This failure has left many large companies basking in the glow of a
bright financial forecast and has burdened the FDA with increasing
regulatory challenges and obstacles to meet its burden to consum-
ers'9 and ensure product safety."0
13. See, e.g., GENERAL NUTRITION CENTER (GNC), ABOUT GNC,
http://www.gnc.com/corp/index.jsp (last visited Jan. 29, 2006) (stating that GNC
has been in business since 1935).
14. Levitt, supra note 12; see also Jennifer Sardina, Note, Misconceptions and Mis-
leading Information Prevail-Less Regulation Does not Mean Less Danger to Consumers:
Dangerous Herbal Weight Loss Products, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 107, 125 (1999-2000) (stat-
ing that supplements are no longer confined to small, remotely located health food
stores, they are now "frequently found in ... malls, plazas, on television, in cata-
logs, and on-line").
15. Dana Ziker, What Lies Beneath: An Examination of the Underpinnings of Dietary
Supplement Safety Regulation, 31 AM.J.L. & MED. 269, 271 (2005).
16. Bruce H. Schindler, Where There's Smoke There's Fire: The Dangers of the Un-
regulated Dietary Supplement Industry, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 261, 261 (1998).
17. Levitt, supra note 12.
18. Id (suggesting that although the market growth was intended, the DSHEA
did not predict the regulatory challenges that would stem from the changes).
19. FDA, supra note 5.
20. Levitt, supra note 12; see generally Nutracuetical v. Crawford, 364 F. Supp. 2d
1310 (D. Utah, 2005) rev'd sub nom. Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von Eschenbach, 459
F.3d 1033 (10th Cir. 2006) petition for cert. filed, 75 USWL 3368 (Jan. 3, 2007)(06-
922) (supporting the proposition that the regulatory scheme of the DSHEA is not
sufficient to ensure safety if it cannot remove products, such as ephedra, that have a
well documented history of adverse events). [Ed. Note: The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded Nutracuetical, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1310, after this
article was submitted. On Appeal, the Court held it was proper for the FDA to use
a balancing test and the use of that balancing test did not in fact shift the burden of
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This article begins with an overview of the struggle between
FDA and the dietary supplement industry for the power to control
dietary supplement regulation,2' and continues into a discussion of
the current regulatory scheme, DSHEA.2 The analysis that follows
indicates that DSHEA, without amendment, will not serve its pur-
pose to protect consumers, and argues that the current shortcom-
ings of the dietary supplement regulatory scheme are not caused by
DSHEA as a regulatory mechanism, but by the ambiguous terms
within its provisions. 3 Specifically, the lobbying power of the dietary
supplement industry caused DSHEA to be a political compromise
that promised law in a hurry without giving due care to its repercus-
sions. ' Joining cited academics, this article further suggests that
DSHEA is in need of amendment if consumers are to be protected
and the dietary supplement industry is to remain strong." Finally,
this article concludes by moving the dietary supplement debate for-
ward and suggests specific amendments that if made, would move
DSHEA one-step closer to creating balance. 6
II. OVERVIEW
The legislative history of dietary supplements in the United
States details the clash of a governing body, and a strong commer-
cial market, each maintaining the common goal of providing con-
sumers with dietary supplements. 7 Since 1867, FDA and its prede-
cessors have been charged with the responsibility of using federal
law to protect consumers from adulterated 8 or misbranded food
and drugs.' Further, because FDA is an agency under a democratic
government, consumers inherently have the ability to affect the level
proof from FDA to the plaintiff. As of February 19, 2007, the petition had not
been acted upon. The implications of the subsequent history are beyond the scope
of this comment.]
21. See infra Part 11.
22. See infta Part II.C.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part III. See also Barbara A. Noah, Foreword: Dietary Supplement Regu-
lation in Flux, 31 AM.J.L. & MED. 147, 147 (2005) (stating that the DSHEA was cre-
ated in response to "anxious lobbying" by the dietary supplement industry).
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. See infta Part III.B.
29. John P. Swann, History of the FDA, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/
historyoffda/fulltext.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2007).
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and types of control FDA maintains.' Recently, FDA and the die-
tary supplement industry have faced-off through political debates
and legislative action." At present, many would say that the industry
has won with the passage of DSHEA, creating both positive and
negative implications for dietary supplement consumers."
A. The Relative Interests of FDA and the Dietary Supplement Industry
In creating dietary supplement regulation Congress is influ-
enced by the lobbying efforts of two primary entities, FDA and the
dietary supplement industry." In general, Congress is required to
create legislation that is in the best interest of the people, however,
the relative lobbying powers of the dietary supplement industry and
FDA are impossible to ignore. '
The FDA, as an agency of the federal government, acts in the
interest of the American people.' Charged to protect the food sup-
ply, FDA creates regulations that, at times, have the effect of limiting
the number and types of products Americans have access to.' Regu-
lation, however, is not meant to eradicate the use of products cate-
gorically, thus FDA advocates the use of dietary supplements by the
American people so long as they are safe." In order to reach this
30. Id. (noting that in the late 1800s, the Division of Chemistry was using human
subjects to consume "questionable food additives" which spurred public outcry and
urged federal law to prohibit the sale of adulterated or misbranded food and
drugs).
31. See generally Kaiser, supra note 6 (discussing the legislative progression of the
dietary supplement industry as influenced by the dietary supplement industry and
the FDA).
32. Noah, supra note 24 (stating that the DSHEA would severely limit the FDA's
authority). See generally supra Part I (stating that while dietary supplement access
has increased, safety regulation has become more difficult for the FDA and the
safety of all currently marketed dietary supplements is not certain).
33. Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1271-72.
34. Wais, supra note 8, at 865-66. Wais stated that the dietary supplement indus-
try is a very large political lobbying force. Id. Not only did politicians have a large
monetary incentive to cooperate with the dietary supplement industry, but also, the
dietary supplement industry employs tens of thousands of people directly and indi-
rectly, creating an economic benefit to society and strong incentives for politicians
to support the industry. Id. Further, the dietary supplement industry has been
consistently among the top campaign contributors to lawmakers. Id. In 2000, the
industry donated $2.3 million to Representatives who worked in its favor. Id.
35. FDA, supra note 5.
36. Id.
37. Lester M. Crawford, Acting Commissioner of the FDA, Speech before Coun-
cil for Responsible Nutrition: Annual Conference (Oct. 25, 2004), http://
www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2004/crnIO25.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2007).
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goal, FDA promotes increasing the regulation of the dietary sup-
plement industry.' Moreover, FDA believes tightening down on the
policies within DSHEA is the only way to increase consumer access
and safety, simultaneously.3
While the dietary supplement industry also advocates the use of
dietary supplements by Americans, its interests are in profit maximi-
zation, market growth, and creating products that are safe enough
to achieve repeat sales but that avoid creating expensive lawsuits."'
Profit maximization and market growth are benefited by legislation
that removes barriers to entry and that reduces costs related to
product formation.41 Deregulation within the dietary supplement
industry through DSHEA has also resulted in less safety regula-
tions. Manufacturers therefore find it easier to market products
that meet the legal standard of "safe" and consequently, avoid law-
suits.4 Therefore, each of the dietary supplement industry's goals
has benefited by the deregulation of DSHEA."
B. History
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938 (FDCA)
was the first legislation to regulate products with a quasi-
therapeutic"' effect, such as dietary supplements.' Also recognizing
the dietary properties of vitamins and minerals, 7 FDCA recognized
a need for regulation and gave FDA the power to remove these
products from the market and condition the sale of such products
with pre-market approval.4" In the early days of FDCA, FDA could
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1272.
41. Margaret Gilhooley, Herbal Remedies and Dietary Supplements: The Boundaries
of Drug Claims and the Freedom of Choice, 49 FLA. L. REV. 663, 676 (1997).
42. Wais, supra note 8, at 878.
43. Id.
44. Gilhooley, supra note 41 (illustrating that the lack of market regulation in the
1980s spurred market growth); see also Wais, supra note 8, at 865 (stating, "[w]hen
an industry stands to expand and become more profitable, legislation often accom-
panies the expansion to assist and maintain that industry not only for the public's
benefit, but also for the politicians' benefit.").
45. See Swann, supra note 29 (noting that drug products that have a therapeutic
effect are those that change the chemistry of the body; however, dietary supple-
ments, along with caffeinated beverages are considered quasi-therapeutic because
they alter the chemistry of the body, but not as significantly.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Wais, supra note 8, at 852.
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classify a dietary supplement as a food, drug, or food additive. 9 The
classification then dictated the standards that the dietary supple-
ment would have to satisfy before entering the market." FDA's in-
terpretation of the law at that time was that a dietary supplement
should be classified based on its intended use by the manufacturer."
This interpretation gave manufacturers the upper hand in control-
ling how the supplement was categorized and regulated.
The dichotomy created by FDCA, categorizing a dietary sup-
plement as a "drug" versus a "food," is the prominent source of con-
flict between FDA and the dietary supplement industry." Dictated
by the considerable difference in food and drug approval methods,
the controversy has manifested as a battle between FDA and indus-
try leaders over how to regulate dietary supplements.'
1. Food and Drug Approval Processes
In order for a new pharmaceutical, or drug, to enter the mar-
ket, the manufacturer is subject to stringent pre-market approval.
In part, obtaining approval for a new drug's labeling and advertising
requires a showing of substantial evidence of safety and efficacy
through meticulous clinical research.' If dietary supplements were
classified as drugs, manufacturers would be subject to the same re-
quirements, including required approval and scientific testing to
prove safety.
A "food product," on the other hand, requires no pre-market
approval and is considered safe unless the government can prove
49. Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1251.
50. Id. at 1251-52. (stating that under FDCA a supplement's classification as a
food additive forced the manufacturer to spend a considerable amount of time and
money to market the product).
51. Id. at 1252.
52. Peter Barton Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary
Supplements, 31 AM.J.L. & MED. 155, 157 (2005). Wais, supra note 8, at 852. If the
product's labeling indicated a use for medicinal purposes, the product was deemed
a dietary ingredient and was regulated as a drug, which required that the manufac-
turer prove product safety. Id. Products represented solely for use to supplement
the diet were called dietary foods; these products were regulated under FDCA as a
food, which was presumed to be safe. Id.
53. Gilhooley, supra note 41, at 671.
54. See infra Section III.B.1.
55. Hutt, supra note 52, at 182.
56. Id.
57. Deborah Burke & Anderson Page, Regulating the Dietary Supplement Industry:
Something Still Needs to Change, 1 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 191, 129 (2005).
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that it may reasonably "injure the health of a consumer."' Any sub-
stance that may become a component of, or change the characteris-
tics of a food is called a "food additive;" these products are also
within the category of "food."' "Food additives," however, are pre-
sumptively unsafe and require pre-market approval by (1) filing a
food additives petition for the new ingredient, or (2) showing that
the ingredient is "generally recognized as safe" (GRAS).60 This re-
quires the manufacturer to show, by scientific procedures, the new
ingredient is safe under the conditions of its intended use.61 Dietary
supplements are currently regulated as a food; accordingly, they are
presumed to be safe and enter the market without FDA approval.62
The marked differences in the pre-market approval requirements
for "foods" and "drugs" illustrate why the dietary supplement indus-
try has such a strong interest in the regulatory methods of dietary
supplements.3
2. Continued History
In the early 1960s, through a combined effort of FDA and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC),' dietary supplements were heav-
ily regulated under the Food Additive Amendment to FDCA.'
These two organizations spent more money trying to regulate die-
tary supplements than in any other area.' The increased regulatory
efforts led to a 1962 goal of only approving those supplements for
which there was a recognized need and eradicating "myths of nutri-
tion.
67
58. U.S. v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 411 (1914).
59. FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2000) [hereinafter FDCA].
60. Id. § 348.
61. Id. § 348(a).
62. Burke & Page, supra note 57, at 128.
63. McCann, supra note 4, at 228 (stating that proof of safety and effectiveness,
at least in a clinical sense, is often hard to establish for dietary supplements).
64. FTC, A Guide to the Federal Trade Commission, (2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/general/guidetoftc.htm (stating that the
FTC has a long tradition of maintaining a competitive marketplace for both con-
sumers and businesses by preventing unfair methods of competition in commerce).
65. Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1252 (stating that the amendment granted the FDA
the authority to regulate dietary ingredients as food additives and to evaluate the
safety of all new ingredients).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1253. Examples of these "myths of nutrition" include statements such
as, "it is essentially impossible to obtain from our daily diets the nutrients we re-
quire," and "the modem processing of food strips them of virtually all nutritional
value." Id.
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Until this time, FDA had retained control of dietary supplement
regulation; however, the hyper-regulation of the early 1960s angered
parts of the American public, causing an immediate attack on FDA's
new approach.' It was not until 1973 that FDA retreated from its
"myths of nutrition" regulatory scheme.69
The dietary supplement industry won a small struggle when
FDA adjusted this position; however, FDA was not ready to concede
its position entirely.0 In an effort to stay in control of the dietary
supplement market, FDA altered its method of regulation and be-
gan prohibiting "irrational combinations" and dosages of vitamins
and minerals when sold as foods.7' Specifically, FDA stated that it
intended to treat high-dose supplements as drugs.7'
The Second Circuit gave qualified approval to this method of
regulation when it held that FDA had the authority to protect con-
sumers from irrational combinations and excessive doses in National
Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA.73 The court also held, however, that
FDA could not classify high-dose supplements as a drug.' FDA ac-
cepted this ruling as a victory.75
The 1974 case would mark a turning point for the dietary sup-
plement industry. The court's ruling incited a strong reaction from
consumers who, through great lobbying efforts, pressured Congress
to take back some control of dietary supplement regulation.76 Con-
gress responded with the Proxmire Amendment, which essentially
revoked FDA's ability to regulate supplements based on irrational
combinations or potency.' The amendment was further strength-
ened by a court decision striking down FDA attempts to limit po-
78tency.
68. Id. at 1254
69. Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1253.
70. See generally id. at 1253.
71. Id. at 1253.
72. Id.
73. 504 F.2d 761, 782 (1974). The court looked favorably on the FDA's attempt
to regulate the dietary supplement market more strictly. Id.
74. Id. at 789.
75. Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1253-54.
76. Id. at 1254.
77. See The Proxmire Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-278, 90 Stat. 401 (1976)
(amending 21 U.S.C. § 349).
78. See generally National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Matthews, 552 F.2d 325
(10th Cir. 1977).
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The amendment and the court decisions "dissuaded the agency
[FDA] from routinely regulating these products,"79 and so FDA en-
tered a period of regulatory restraint, acting only when a specific
safety concern arose.80 This period of restraint made it easier for
additional types of products to be sold as dietary supplements and
resulted in a significant expansion in the number of supplements on
the market by the 1990s.8"
The dietary supplement industry was thriving until the Fall of
1989, when 38 deaths and 1,500 adverse effects were attributed to L-
tryptophan, an amino acid, sold as a dietary supplement and widely
used to promote bodybuilding.' The health crisis led to renewed
scrutiny of supplement safety." Determined to restore its strong
regulatory hold on the dietary supplement industry, FDA issued an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Advance Notice). ' The
Advance Notice stated in part that the immediate goal was con-
sumer safety, but also indicated that many herbal drug products
would be the subject of regulatory action.' The Advance Notice
created controversy throughout the dietary supplement industry
because it was seen as an attempt by FDA to revert to the higher
levels of regulation as in the 1960s, and the industry feared removal
of many products from stores.' Leaders in the dietary supplement
industry warned that increased regulations would put retailers out
of business and diminish consumer rights to buy vitamins.'
The FDA Commissioner attempted to alleviate consumer fear
by making a statement that all products currently on sale would con-
tinue to be sold, so long as they did not present a safety hazard.'
79. FDA Regulation: Compliance by Dietary Supplement and Conventional
Food Establishments, (June 13, 1994) (writing by Mark V. Nadel, Associate Director,
National and Public Health Issues).
80. Gilhooley, supra note 41.
81. Id.
82. See Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,690, 33,695-96 (June
8, 1993).
83. Gilhooley, supra note 41, at 677.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 678.
87. See Peter J. Cohen, Science, Politics; and the Regulation of Dietary Supplements:
It's Time to Repeal DSHEA, 31 AM.J.L. & MED. 175, 180 (2005). Leaders also organ-
ized a "national blackout day" where stores draped products in black that were the
target of the Advance Notice so that consumers could see what the FDA was trying
to take away. Id.
88. Legislative Issues Related to the Regulation of Dietary Supplements: Hearings of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong. 19 (1993).
[VOL. 2:361
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Consumer reaction to the Advance Notice, however, had already
stimulated enough support for the legislative efforts that would lead
to the passage of DSHEA'
Meanwhile, as it seemed the industry would easily take control
of regulation, Congress passed the Nutrition Labeling and Educa-
tion Act of 1990 (NLEA).' NLEA required "foods" and "food sup-
plements" to be labeled with certain nutritional information." This
again upset manufacturers who were concerned with the cost of ad-
ditional research, and prompted an industry rally that called on
Congress to rethink the new requirements." Due to pressure from
the dietary supplement industry, Congress backed down by enacting
the Dietary Supplement Act of 1992 that placed a one-year morato-
rium on NLEAY
During that year, the supplement industry lobbied heavily to
have NLEA repealed.' The effort was unsuccessful, but those in-
volved in the lobbying efforts were able to reorganize and consoli-
date into an impenetrable initiative for reforms to the laws govern-
ing dietary supplements.95 Respected consumer protection and pub-
lic health organizations lobbied against DSHEA, but eventually lost
when Congress, siding with the lesser-known DSHEA supporters,
enacted DSHEA.'
C. A Look at the Current Regulatory Scheme: DSHEA
After DSHEA passed unanimously in both the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate"7 it had four major impacts on the regula-
tion of dietary supplements." First, it created a new, broad defini-
tion of dietary supplements and identified dietary supplements as a
sub-category of food.' This change was beneficial to manufacturers
because it gave dietary supplements the advantage of being consid-
89. Gilhooley, supra note 41, at 678.
90. NLEA, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (repealed 1992).
91. Id.
92. Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1259.
93. Dietary Supplement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4500 (1992)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
94. Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1259.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1259-60.
97. Id. at 1260-61.
98. Wais, supra note 8, at 853.
99. Id.
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ered safe without requiring any testing to substantiate the assump-
tion."° Second, it created the Office of Dietary Supplements (ODS),
a sub-agency of FDA, that was given the power to research dietary
supplements and substantiate claims made by manufacturers."'
Third, the labeling requirements of dietary supplements became
more lenient, allowing structure or function claims to appear on the
supplements."2 Finally, the burden of proving product safety shifted
from the manufacturer, before the product was marketed, to FDA,
after the product was on the market.0 DSHEA established an en-
tirely new regulatory scheme for dietary supplement products."°
III. ANALYSIS
DSHEA includes the following sections: definitions, safety re-
quirements, labeling of dietary supplements, new dietary ingredi-
ents, good manufacturing practices, and administrative processes
with relation to dietary supplements." The content of each of these
provisions seems, at face value, to serve a specific purpose and even
to be entirely capable of serving that purpose; however, the short-
comings of DSHEA are real and should be attributed to a lack of
specificity of the included definitions and the design of each sec-
tion.'" Three sections that have particularly noteworthy examples of
ambiguity are the definitions, safety, and labeling provisions.
A. A Lack of Important Definitions has Created Overwhelming
Ambiguity within DSHEA
The breadth of the dietary supplement definition provides a
compelling source of ambiguity for DSHEA.' °7 A "dietary supple-
ment" is defined generally as a product that bears or contains a vi-
tamin, mineral, herb, amino acid, other botanical, or other dietary
substance for use by man to supplement the diet by increasing the
total dietary intake.0 8 Further, the dietary supplement must be a
100. Id. at 854.
101. Id
102. Id. at 855.
103. Wais, supra note 8, at 855.
104. Robert G. Pinco & Paul D. Rubin, Ambiguities of the Dietary Supplement Health
and Education Act of 1994, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 383, 383 (1996).
105. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, supra note 1.
106. See infra Part IV.
107. Pinco & Rubin, supra note 104, at 384.
108. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act § 321(ff)(1)(A)-(F) (YEAR).
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product that is "intended for ingestion," must not be represented
for use as a conventional food or as a sole item of a meal or the diet,
and must be labeled as a dietary supplement.1° The definition spe-
cifically excludes dietary supplements from regulation as a food ad-
ditive under FDCA. '0 Finally, the definition concludes by stating
that a dietary supplement shall be deemed a "food" within the
meaning of this act."'
The definition of a "dietary supplement" is expansive and rep-
resentative of Congress' intent to include the broadest possible
range of ingredients."'2 The negative result of the broad definition
has been an exploitation of its ambiguous terms."3 Three words
within the definition that have been a source of controversy are
"dietary substance," "ingestion," and "article.""
4
1. Dietary Substance
The term "dietary substance" is found in the "catch-all""' provi-
sion, under the "dietary supplement" definition, which includes "a
dietary substance for use by man to supplement the diet by increas-
ing the total dietary intake.""' The phrase "dietary substance" is
part of the dietary supplement definition, but is not defined by
DSHEA or any other regulatory provision."' As a result, even prod-
ucts that are not used to "supplement the diet by increasing dietary
intake,""8 as the provision requires, are included as dietary supple-
ments under this provision."'
The dietary supplement industry has historically interpreted the
term "dietary substance" broadly to include such products as mela-
109. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act § 321(ff(2)(B)-(G)(YEAR).
110. A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 215 (Kenneth
R. Pina & Wayne L. Pines eds., 2nd ed. 2002).
111. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act § 321(ff) (YEAR).
112. Bass & Marden, supra note 3, at 294 (stating that one reason for the breadth
of the definition was to assure the industry that ingredients used in dietary supple-
ments before the DSHEA would still be available).
113. See generally U.S. v. Ten Cartons, More or Less, of an Article Ener-B Vitamin
B-12 72 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 1995); Pharmanex v. Shalala 221 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir.
2000).
114. Susan Onel, Dietary Supplements: A Definition that is Black, White, and Gray, 31
AM.J.L. & MED. 341, 342 (2005).
115. Pinco & Rubin, supra note 104, at 384.
116. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act § 321(ff(1)(E) (YEAR).
117. Onel, supra note 114, at 342.
118. DSHEA, supra note 116 (YEAR).
119. See Onel, supra note 114, at 342.
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tonin, shark cartilage, and coenzyme Q10.120 Ingredients such as
these, however, "do not fit the definition of vitamins, minerals, bo-
tanicals or amino acid, but represent a significant portion of the
dietary supplement marketplace." 12 1 Until recently, "little attention
was given to the fact that these products do not 'supplement the diet
by increasing the total dietary intake;'" however, FDA has made
statements that it would narrow the scope of the catch-all provision
by reducing dietary substances to include only dietary ingredients
that are commonly found in human food and drink."' Narrowing
the scope of the "dietary substance" provision would be helpful be-
cause a thorough reading of the "catch-all" provision, as is, would
require asking three questions: (1) is it a dietary substance? (2) is it
used to supplement the diet? and (3) will it increase the dietary in-
take?12' DSHEA, however, does not provide a framework for answer-
ing these questions; therefore, they are not easily answered. 4
Narrowing the scope of the term "dietary substance" would
pose problems for a large number of dietary supplement products
and have a significant impact on "a coalition of three of the largest
supplement associations, the National Nutritional Foods Associa-
tion, the Council for Responsible Nutrition, the American Herbal
Products Association, as well as manufacturers, retailers, and raw
material suppliers for the supplement industry."' 
25
The response, to FDA's suggested interpretation, was a citizen peti-
tion requesting that FDA restate its position, and since then, FDA
has taken no action.'
26
2. Intended for Ingestion
The definition of a dietary supplement also requires that the
product be "intended for ingestion. ""7 This, by definition, would
exclude topical creams, nose-sprays and injectables. Yet, manufac-
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 34243.
123. Pinco & Rubin, supra note 104, at 384.
124. Id.
125. Onel, supra note 114, at 342.
126. Id. at 34243
127. DSHEA § 321(ff)(2)(A)(i).
128. Pinco & Rubin, supra note 104, at 384.
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turers have still attempted to pass such products as dietary supple-
ments.
FDA has been able to assert some regulatory control in the
form of "courtesy letters."3 In fact, many companies have received
"courtesy letters" from FDA stating that their product does not fall
under the definition of a dietary supplement.5 ' The letter explains,
that dietary supplements must be "intended for ingestion" in "tablet,
capsule, powder, softgel, gelcap, or liquid form.'512 The letter fur-
ther explains the definition of "ingestion," that the company's prod-
uct does not meet this definition, and therefore cannot be catego-
rized as a dietary supplement."' In support of this decision, FDA
relied on United States v. Ten Cartons,M which held that a vitamin
product intended to be applied inside the nose does not come
within the meaning of a dietary supplement."0
This example illustrates an important aspect of the problems
with DSHEA. Here, even where Congress has provided a clear, un-
derstandable definition, the dietary supplement industry still at-
tempts to test boundaries, which results in litigation.' This time,
the court agreed with FDA, but if FDA is to have any control over
dietary supplements, the act should be inclusive of definitions so
that companies cannot challenge each FDA decision in court before
accepting FDA's ruling.'37 In addition, even in the wake of this deci-
sion, and FDA taking an affirmative position on the definition of
"ingestion," some companies, with products such as lozenges and
mouthwashes, have succeeded in marketing their products as dietary
supplements by focusing on the fact that the product only has an
129. See generally Ten Cartons, 72 F.3d 285. The manufacturer asserted that a
product topically applied on the interior nasal wall was in fact a dietary supplement.
Id. at 287.
130. "Courtesy letters" are mailed prior to the FDA taking official action and
allow the manufacturer to correct the problem without legal interference. See, e.g.,
Courtesy Letter from Susan J. Walker, Dir., Div. of Dietary Supplement Programs,
FDA, to Sara Katz, President, Herb Pharm. (Jan. 15, 2004) (regarding herbal
mouthwash), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/July04/071204/
071204.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2007).
131. Pinco & Rubin, supra note 104, at 384.
132. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act § 350(c)(1)(B)(i).
133. See Onel, supra note 114, at 343-44. "[I]ngestion means to take into the
stomach and gastrointestinal tract by means of enteral administration and not by
transmucosal or sublingual absorption." Id.
134. Ten Cartons, 72 F.3d 285.
135. Ten Cartons, 72 F.3d at 286; see also Pinco & Rubin, supra note 104, at 384.
136. See generally Ten Cartons, 72 F.3d 285.
137. See generally infra Part IV.
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effect after it is absorbed in the gastrointestinal system."u This sug-
gests that there is simply not enough continuity or power in DSHEA
for FDA to have effective control over dietary supplements.
3. What is an Article?
Another term that has required clarification through litigation
is found in sub-part three of the statutory definition of a dietary
supplement. '39 Sub-part three is divided into two provisions: the first
dictates what types of products are included in the definition, and
the second delineates, which types of products are excluded.'4 ° Each
of these sections uses the noun "article" as a placeholder for the
item in question. 4'
The ambiguity of the term "article" was assessed in Pharmanex,
due to a dispute over whether the term "article" refers to a compo-
nent, or a finished product.4" Pharmanex, a pharmaceutical com-
pany, marketed Cholestrin as a dietary supplement for maintaining
a healthy cholesterol level.1" The alleged dietary supplement was
composed solely of traditional milled red yeast rice, which FDA ar-
gued was a natural source of mevinolin, and is chemically indistin-
guishable from lovastatin, the active ingredient in the prescription
drug Mevacor.' 5 As a result, FDA advised Pharmanex that it consid-
ered Cholestrin to be a drug and therefore required pre-market ap-
proval by FDA.'6 FDA subsequently barred Pharmanex from im-
porting red yeast rice, and Pharmanex, in turn, brought an action
for preliminary injunction and declaratory judgment against FDA."7
The case required the court to decide whether the product
Cholestrin was subject to 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(3)(B). 8 FDA asserted
that lovastatin itself, was an "article" approved as a new drug.'9
Therefore, according to 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(3)(b), the product would
138. See Onel, supra note 114, at 343-44.
139. See generally Pharmanex v. Shalala, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (C.D. Ut. 1999) (re-
versed); see also Pharmanex 221 F.3d 1151.
140. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act § 321(ff(3).
141. Id.
142. 35 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (C.D. Ut. 1999) (reversed).
143. Pharmanex, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1346-47.
144. Id. at 1344.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1344-45.
147. Id. at 1344.
148. See generally Pharmanex, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1341.
149. Id. at 1346.
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be excluded from the definition of a dietary supplement.'0 The
court, however, agreed with Pharmanex and determined that "arti-
cle" refered to the finished drug product only, and not a component
of the product."' Based on the district court's ruling DSHEA was
unable to keep Cholestrin from being marketed and regulated as a
dietary supplement.1
2
The decision, if implemented, would have two effects.' First,
under the court's interpretation, any slight variant to a prescription
drug would circumvent the exclusionary component of DSHEA's
dietary supplement definition.'" This would encourage dietary sup-
plement manufacturers to find slight variants or alternatives to pre-
scription drugs and undermine the prescription drug market by sell-
ing the variants or alternatives as dietary supplements.' Second,
the decision "encourages manufacturers of dietary supplements to
find and market 'natural' substances, which are the active ingredi-
ents in prescription drugs, without going through the [new drug
approval] process otherwise required.' '.6  Therefore, prescription
drug manufacturers would be discouraged from going through
clinical trials for fear that a dietary supplement manufacturer could
market the same product at a lower cost and with less regulation.'
FDA appealed, and the decision was overturned.' The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that definitions within
DSHEA, including the word "article," are often interpreted
broadly.' The court therefore held that the act uses the term "arti-
cle," in 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(A)-(C), while referring to both prod-
ucts and their components.' ° The act also uses the terms "product"
and "active ingredients" in other sections.'6 ' The use of these other
terms suggest that the drafters were aware of their word choice and
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1348.
152. See generally Pharmanex, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1341.
153. Robert C. Pinco & Todd H. Halpern, Guidelines for the Promotion of Dietary
Supplements: Examining Government Regulation Five Years After Enactment of the Dietary
Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 567, 571 (1999).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Laura A. W. Khatcheressian, Regulation of Dietary Supplements: Five Years of
DSHEA, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 623, 634 (1999).
157. Id.
158. See generally Pharmanex, 221 F.3d 1151.
159. Id. at 1159-60.
160. Id. at 1156.
161. Id.
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therefore used the word "article" with purpose to mean both com-
ponent and finished product. '62
This decision was positive for FDA and DSHEA, because it
showed that DSHEA was serving its purpose to regulate dietary sup-
plements.6 ' Further, the decision became important for consumers
when extended research showed that lovastatin can cause liver dys-
function and should not be used by women who are likely to be-
come pregnant." If lovastatin was allowed to be marketed as a die-
tary supplement, this information would have never reached the
public given that dietary supplements require no pre-market ap-
proval."
4. Ambiguity in DSHEA has Influenced Industry Behavior
The ambiguities in DSHEA have been a source of litigation be-
tween FDA and the industry." In addition, DSHEA regulation has
affected industry behavior and the relationship between FDA and
manufacturers.' 7 Specifically, the lack of pre-market regulation has
encouraged manufacturers to manipulate their products to fit within
the definition of a dietary supplement."
A case on point is Johnson & Johnson's efforts to market
Benecol (a margarine that purported to lower cholesterol levels) as a
dietary supplement rather than as a food or drug.'" FDA made a
finding that the active ingredient in the product represented an un-
approved food additive and therefore required FDA pre-market ap-
proval.'70 Following FDA's decision, however, FDA and Johnson &
Johnson engaged in a lengthy negotiation where they compro-
mised.' The decision indicated the product would be designated as
a food, not a dietary supplement, and would enjoy GRAS status (like
"food") and not subject to pre-market approval (analogous to a die-
162. Id.
163. Khatcheressian, supra note 156.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See supra Section III.A.1-3.
167. McCann, supra note 4, at 248.
168. This is especially true since products that are not new dietary ingredients
require no pre-market evaluation. See Ziker, supra note 15, at 279. Indicating
products will get to stay on the market until the FDA takes the affirmative step of
removing them regardless of whether or not the product is in fact a dietary sup-
plement. Id.
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tary supplement)." It seems, the mere presence of DSHEA has
given manufacturers a "certain degree of negotiating leverage" with
FDA that is reducing regulatory costs outside of the dietary supple-
ment industry.'T
B. Ambiguity in the Safety Provision of DSHEA
The concerns with the safety provisions of DSHEA are arguably
based in "the essential fiction" that "because dietary supplements
are considered 'foods,' they need not be subject to the stringent re-
quirements for new drug approval."'74 This belief has led to the
statutory presumption that because a dietary supplement is a "food,"
it is safe, and further, that components of food can be taken in large
quantities without producing ill effects.'75
DSHEA explicitly removes dietary supplements from regulation
as drugs, as food additives, and, interestingly, also as a conventional
food. "' 6 Instead, the regulations under DSHEA are specific to die-
tary supplements and provide that a manufacturer must merely no-
tify FDA, and provide "some evidence" that the new dietary ingredi-
ent is "reasonably safe" seventy-five days prior to marketing the
product,"' with the exception that products marketed before Octo-
ber 15, 1994, are completely exempt from this requirement. 8
Once a product is on the market, FDA has three methods of
regulation.9 First, FDA may regulate a "grandfathered supple-
ment, "" or other dietary supplement if it can prove that the sup-
plement is adulterated and presents an unreasonable risk of illness
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Cohen, supra note 87, at 191.
175. See id.; see also Burke & Page, supra note 57, at 130.
176. Foods demonstrate their safety by long-term use and presence in the market,
or new foods have to prove that they are GRAS, a standard that had been tested
and well understood by the FDA. See DSHEA § 342(f).
177. DSHEA § 350b(b).
178. These products are simply "dietary supplements" and are not subject to the
regulations of a "new dietary ingredient." See generally DSHEA § 350b(c). The
only distinction between a new dietary ingredient, which requires pre-market ap-
proval, and "dietary supplements," which do not require any pre-market approval,
is the date of first market. Id. The result is that unsafe products marketed before
October of 1994 will not be removed from the market until citizens are harmed by
the product, while unsafe products trying to be sold after October of 1994 will be
evaluated by the FDA to ensure consumer safety. Id.
179. See generally DSHEA § 342.
180. See DSHEA § 342. A supplement marketed before October 15, 1994, re-
quired no pre-market approval.
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or injury under the conditions recommended or suggested in the
labeling.'81 Second, DSHEA provides for an emergency measure
whereby the Secretary of the United States Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS)"82 has the authority to declare that a die-
tary supplement presents an imminent and substantial hazard to
public safety.I" This administrative determination results in the ban
of that product from the marketplace.'" Third, FDA is able to moni-
tor supplements through Adverse Event Reports (AER), this com-
prises their post-market regulatory ability." The AER system con-
sists of voluntary reporting from industry participants, health care
providers, and consumers." The well-intentioned system, however,
is less than perfect. The Inspector General'87 for HHS1' estimates
that the AER system reveals less than one percent of actual adverse
reactions to dietary supplements.
At first glance, this section provides FDA with substantial dis-
cretion to take regulatory action, allowing the agency to use its
judgment in determining what constitutes a significant or unreason-
181. DSHEA § 342(f)(1)(A)(i). Specifically, the dietary supplement must meet the
adulteration standard under 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1)(YEAR?). Section 3 4 2(a)(1) states
that a food is deemed adulterated "[i]f it bears or contains any poisonous or delete-
rious substance which may render it injurious to health; but in case the substance is
not an added substance such food shall not be considered adulterated under this
clause if the quantity of such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it
injurious to health." DSHEA § 342(a)(1).
182. HHS, Biography of Mike Leavitt: Secretary of HHS, (Jan. 26, 2005),
http://www.hhs.gov/about/bios/dhhssec.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2006) (stating
that Michael 0. Leavitt is the 20th Secretary of HHS, and as Secretary, he leads
national efforts to protect the health of all Americans and provide essential human
services to those in need).
183. See DSHEA § 342(f)(1)(C); see also Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1263 (indicating
this will only happen if the secretary becomes aware of a large amount of adverse
event reports).
184. Bass & Marden, supra note 3, at 288.
185. McCann, supra note 4, at 251.
186. Id.
187. HSS, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Mission, http://www.
oig.hhs.gov/organization/OIGmission.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2006) (stating that
the OIG protects the integrity of HHS programs, and has a responsibility to report
to the Secretary and to the Congress program and management problems, along
with recommendations).
188. HHS, What We Do, (2005), at http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html/
(last visited Sept. 7, 2006). "The Department of Health and Human Services is the
United States government's principal agency for protecting the health of all Ameri-
cans and providing essential human services, especially for those who are least able
to help themselves." Id.
189. McCann, supra note 4, at 251.
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able risk.'" If, however, FDA recognizes a problem and is inclined
to remove the product, the statutory requirement is that the burden
of proof must fall on FDA to show that the product is not safe or
more specifically, adulterated.'9 ' With the burden of proof on the
government, the manufacturers are under no requirement to par-
ticipate by offering adverse event reports or information on product
safety."2 Further increasing FDA's burden, DSHEA lays out certain
legal procedures to be followed concerning dietary supplement
safety enforcement. 9' These procedures have the effect of remov-
ing some FDA power over administrative review of dietary supple-
ments. '4
1. No Control: Ephedra
In 1997, FDA took its first step into the ephedra'9" contro-
versy," noting that while ephedra accounted for only one percent of
dietary supplement sales it was accounting for sixty-four percent of
the AERs.1' FDA proceeded with proposed dosage limitations on
ephedra and recommended strongly worded warnings. '  Due to
190. See Bass & Marden, supra note 3, at 289 (arguing that the DSHEA gives the
FDA substantial regulatory control); but see Nutracuetical v. Crawford, 364 F. Supp.
2d 1310 (D. Utah, 2005) rev'd sub nom. Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von Eschenbach, 459
F.3d 1033 (10th Cir. 2006) petition for cert. filed, 75 USWL 3368 (Jan. 3, 2007)(06-
922) (holding that the FDA's use of a risk/benefit analysis was inappropriate)and
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
191. DSHEA § 342(f0()(O).
192. Noah, supra note 24, at 150.
193. Specifically, when in court on any issue under 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1), such
issue is to be decided de novo by the court rather than by deferring to the FDA
interpretation. Id. Additionally, before the government takes action in the form of
a civil proceeding concerning dietary supplements under 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1)(A),
the adverse party must receive proper notice and an opportunity to be heard.
DSHEA § 342(f)(2).
194. DSHEA § 342(0(2).
195. Michael Sachs, Ephedra and the Failure of Dietary Supplement Regulation, 54
CATH. U. L. REv. 661, 662-63 (2005). "Ephedra is a plant species which has long
been used for medicinal purposes." Id. Ephedra is a "naturally occurring chemical
[stimulant] that cause[s] numerous physiological responses in the body such as
increased blood pressure, heart rate, and brochodilation." Id. "Today, many peo-
ple purchase dietary supplements containing [ephedra] as a means to increase en-
ergy or lose weight." Id.
196. See id. at 682.
197. Ellen Relkin, In re: Ephedra Products Liability Litigation. PCC Memorandum in
Opposition to Ephedra Defendant's Motion to Preclude Plaintiffls Expert Opinion as to
General Causation, SK075 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 425, 445 (2005).
198. Id.
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limitations in DSHEA and a lobbying against the proposed rules,
however, the restrictions and warnings never became mandatory.'"
Over the next six years, FDA solicited comments, gathered AERs,
and, hoping to strengthen its case, commissioned research studies to
assess the risks versus the benefits of ephedra.2 1' The commissioned
studies, however, came back with little useful information, noting
inconsistent data and a low number of AERs. ° States, concerned
for their citizens, quickly recognized that the federal government
was not able to regulate ephedra effectively,2' and over half of the
states created legislation limiting the use and sale of ephedra; three
states, New York, Illinois, and California, banned the sale of
ephedra) °
On February 6, 2004, FDA issued a final rule concluding that
dietary supplements containing ephedra were adulterated because
they presented an unreasonable risk of illness or injury.' ° Announc-
ing:
Government's burden of proof for 'unreasonable risk' is met when a
product's risks outweigh its benefits in light of the claims and directions
for use in the product's labeling or, if the labeling is silent, under ordi-
nary conditions of use. 'Unreasonable risk' thus, represents a relative
weighing of the product's known and reasonably likely risks against its
known and reasonably likely benefits. °5
This final rule, however, did not stand up in court when
Nutraceutical, a dietary supplement producer, sued FDA. °
Nutraceutical requested that the final rule be declared invalid and
FDA be enjoined from taking enforcement action against the com-
pany for its sale of certain products containing ephedra °
The court never reached the issue of safety and instead focused
on FDA's standard for determining "unreasonable risk." °2 8 Citing
199. Id. See also Sachs, supra note 195 at 683.
200. See Sachs, supra note 195, at 682-84.
201. See id. at 683-85.
202. Id. at 685.
203. Id. at 685-87.
204. Final Rule Declaring Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids
Adulterated Because They Present an Unreasonable Risk, 69 Fed. Reg. 6788
(2004)[hereinafter Final Rule Ephedra].
205. Id. at 6822.
206. See generally Nutracuetical v. Crawford, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (D. Utah, 2005)
rev'd sub nom. Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von Eschenbach, 459 F.3d 1033 (10th Cir.
2006) petition for cert. filed, 75 USWL 3368 (Jan. 3, 2007)(06-922). But see supra note
20 and accompanying text.
207. Id. at 1311.
208. Id. at 1313-14.
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the language of DSHEA, FDA argued that the standard of proof
required FDA to prove a "significant" or "unreasonable risk".2 ' Fur-
ther, FDA argued that the words "significant" and "unreasonable"
have two distinct meanings..2 " The term "significant" requires an
inquiry into the risk of a product alone, while the "unreasonable"
standard requires a comparison of the risks and benefits.11 More-
over, "[a] risk could be significant, but reasonable if the benefits
were great enough to outweigh the risks." 212 Further, FDA believed
that in using the "significant risk" standard was unnecessary since it
is included in the statute only as an alternative to the "unreasonable
risk" standard.23  The plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
asked the court to determine whether FDA's risk benefit analysis
was appropriate under DSHEA and whether its findings support the
final rule that some ephedra products pose a "significant" or "un-
reasonable risk."2 4  The court held that the use of a risk-benefit
analysis was not appropriate under DSHEA and therefore failed to
prove the findings of the final rule, that certain ephedra products
were adulterated.1
The outcome of this case illustrates problems within DSHEA.
First, DSHEA does not provide a definition of an "unreasonable
risk," forcing FDA to rely on the statutory language of FDCA.16
Second, the lack of definition and explanation of terms such as,
"unreasonable risk," forces FDA to rely on statutes outside DSHEA
and in doing so, the agency risks losing the benefit of deference in
209. Id. at 1314.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1314.
212. Nutracuetical v. Crawford, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (D. Utah, 2005) rev'd sub
nom. Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von Eschenbach, 459 F.3d 1033 (10th Cir. 2006) peti-
tion for cert. filed, 75 USWL 3368 (Jan. 3, 2007)(06-922) (citing Final Rule Declaring
Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids Adulterated Because They
Present an Unreasonable Risk, 69 Fed. Reg. 6,788 (Feb. 11, 2004)).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1316.
215. Id. at 1318.
216. Id. at 1318. The FDA refers the court to the provisions of the FDCA govern-
ing medical devices and to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Id. FDCA
states in part, "the requirement that risk be unreasonable contemplates a balancing
of the possibility that illness or injury will occur against the benefits of use." FDCA,
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (1976). TSCA defines unreasonable risk as, "balancing the
probabilities that harm will occur and the magnitude and severity of that harm
against the effect of proposed regulatory action on the availability to society of the
benefits of the substance or mixture." Regulation of Hazardous Chemical Sub-
stances and Mixtures, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(1976).
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court.2"7 Finally, the decision that held the balancing test inappro-
priate, did not offer a suggestion as to what analysis would be ap-
propriate, 28 and while the court noted a possible problem with the
exclusion of the "significant" provision from the risk assessment, it
failed to rule on the matter.19 What FDA, industry, and consumers
are now faced with is an assurance of further litigation, no clear
standard of how to prove "unreasonable risk," and the precedent
that FDA rulings are subject to court approval. 2 ' The result was and
still is that FDA has minimal ability to police the safety of dietary
supplements."I
C. Labeling
A final area of concern within DSHEA is the labeling portion
because where labels on dietary supplements should be the first line
of defense for consumers who are trying to find safe products, the
regulation is minimal and the language is open for exploitation.'
The section of DSHEA, titled "Statements of Nutritional Support,"
involves the statements that are permissible on dietary supplement
labels." This section includes three types of claims: health claims,
217. See Id. at 1317-18. The court applies deference to an agency when the statute
is found to be ambiguous. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, (1984). A statute is found to be ambiguous if it is "ca-
pable of being understood in two or more possible senses or ways." Houghton ex
rel. Houghton v. Reinertson, 382 F.3d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir. 2004). (quoting
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 634 U.S. 84, 90 (2001)). In Nutraceutical, the
court found that congressional intent was for the FDA to bear the burden of proof
to show that a dietary supplement is adulterated and therefore, since the balancing
test would require the manufacturer to offer proof of benefit, the statute is unam-
biguous, and the balancing test is inappropriate. Nutracuetical, 364 F. Supp. 2d
1310. But see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
218. Nutracuetical v. Crawford, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (D. Utah, 2005) rev'd sub
nom. Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von Eschenbach, 459 F.3d 1033 (10th Cir. 2006) peti-
tion for cert. filed, 75 USWL 3368 (Jan. 3, 2007)(06-922) (stating that "FDA's defini-
tion of 'unreasonable' entailing a risk-benefit analysis is [sic] improper"). But see
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
219. Id. at 1318 (ruling only that the analysis was inappropriate).
220. See generally id.
221. See generally id.
222. Stephanie Kauflin, Dietary Supplements: Is Availability Worth the Risks? Proposed
Alternatives to the Present DSHEA Scheme, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 411, 422-23 (2003).
223. DSHEA § 301(m). Labeling is defined as "all labels and other written,
printed or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers,
or (2) accompanying such article." Id. While, historically, FDA has interpreted this
definition to include all literature in conjunction with the sale of a product,
DSHEA, exempts certain types of literature and therefore has granted greater free-
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structure/function claims, and nutrient content claims.2 2 ' Health
claims, and their sub-category of "qualified health claims," require
some FDA approval, while nutrient content claims and struc-
ture/function claims do not require any specific approval . 25 As to
all types of claims, however, 21 U.S.C. § 343(r) indicates that a
statement may be presented to the public if the statement claims a
health benefit that is not a claim to diagnose, mitigate, treat, cure, or
prevent a specific disease . 26 The statements must be truthful, not
misleading, and the manufacturer must have substantiation that the
claim is truthful and not misleading. 7 A label publishing one of
these types of claims, also must include the following statement,
prominently displayed in boldface type: "This statement has not
been evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration.
2 2 8
Prior to enactment of DSHEA, a product was regulated based
on its label's suggested function.2' Therefore, any product that sug-
gested that it could cure or mitigate a disease or affect the structure
and function of the body, was considered a drug and required FDA
approval.2 Congress, however, sought to remove dietary supple-
ments from the regulation of drugs; therefore, DSHEA stipulates
that dietary supplements are food, and structure/function claims
are permissible without specific approval.'
On April 29, 1998, FDA proposed, Regulations on Statements
Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effects of the Prod-
uct on the Structure or Function of the Body.2  The proposed regu-
lations became the final rule, which was issued in January of 2000.3
The final rule prohibited disease related claims and allowed struc-
dom for the supplement industry. Kauflin, supra note 222, at 422-23. The specific
guidelines for the labeling exemption are included in section five of DSHEA codi-
fied at DSHEA § 343-42.
224. Kauflin, supra note 222, at 422-23.
225. Office of Nutritional Products, Labeling, and Dietary Supplements, Center
for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN), Claims That Can Be Made for Con-
ventional Foods and Dietary Supplements, (Sept. 2003) at http://www.
cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/hclaims.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
226. DSHEA § 343(r).
227. DSHEA § 343(r).
228. DSHEA § 343(r)(6).
229. Hutt, supra note 52; Wais, supra note 8, at 852.
230. See Hutt, supra note 52; Wais, supra note 8, at 852.
231. Arnold I. Friede, Dietary Supplements: Background for Dialogue Between the
Industry and the Medical Profession, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 413, 417 (1998).
232. Cohen, supra note 87, at 185.
233. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the
Effect of the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 65 Fed. Reg. 1000
(2000).
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ture/function claims."M Like DSHEA legislation, the final rule nei-
ther included pertinent definitions nor did it define the permissible
types of structure/function claims.2 ' As a result, the limits on these
statements are still not clear.
1. Structure Function Claims: A Dietary Supplement to Fix Your
Abnormal Structure
Although there is no definition for a structure/function claim,
the final rule issued in 2000 did attempt to clarify the struc-
ture/function claim by clearly defining the term "disease."27 The
expectation was that by implication of the "disease" definition, per-
missible structure/function claims would be obvious.2' The vague
definition of "disease," however, allows manufacturers to claim that
their products affect the structure and function of the body without
stating that they have the ability to cure disease." The definition
specifically states, "[t]hese criteria are not intended to classify as dis-
ease claims, statements that refer to the ability of a product to main-
tain healthy structure or function. " M Therefore, the definition of
"disease" impliedly creates two categories, "disease" and "abnormal
structure and function." 4' For the layperson, it is virtually impossi-
ble to distinguish between the disease and the abnormal structure
and function, and the statute fails to provide a bright line.
As an example, arthritis is a disease caused by the inflammation
of the joints and soft tissue.43 Therefore, while a dietary supplement
may not claim to cure arthritis, the disease, it may claim to "main-
tain joint health and flexibility," the abnormal structure and func-
234. Cohen, supra note 87, at 185.
235. Friede, supra note 231.
236. See Pinco & Rubin, supra note 104, at 388.
237. Food Labeling, 21 C.F.R. § 101. 9 3 (g)(1) (2005).
238. Friede, supra note 231, at 417.
239. "For purposes of [DSHEA § 343(r)(6)], a 'disease' is damage to an organ,
part, structure, or system of the body such that it does not function properly (e.g.,
cardiovascular disease), or a state of health leading to such dysfunction (e.g., hyper-
tension); except that diseases resulting from essential nutrient deficiencies (e.g.,
scurvy, pellagra) are not included in this definition." 21 C.F.R. § 101.93(g)(1)
(2005); see also Cohen, supra note 87, at 185.
240. Food Labeling, 21 C.F.R. § 101. 9 3(g)(2) (2005).
241. See Cohen, supra note 87, at 185.
242. Id at 185-86.
243. Encarta Online Encyclopedia, Arthritis, http://encarta.msn.com/
encyclopedia_761561517/Arthritis.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
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tion. 2" At issue is the prospect that the allowance of struc-
ture/function claims will encourage undesirable word phrasing to
avoid the regulation required of health claims.2 5 As another exam-
ple, if a supplement label claimed to "reduce the onset of cataracts"
it would be a health claim, and therefore require FDA approval. 6
Yet the same label that claims to "promote healthy vision," will re-
quire no approval as a structure/function claim. 2 47 Although the
structure/function claim is clearly less specific, laypersons may easily
assume the two claims represent similar therapeutic value.' 8 Allow-
ing dietary supplements to make these kinds of claims does align
with the Congressional intent to increase consumer access to dietary
supplements and information."9 Yet, realistically, the new informa-
tion is useless, since the long-term health effects of supplement use,
or how supplements interact with prescription medications is not
known.5'
2. Substantiation: Believing Everything You Read
Once a claim is decidedly a structure/function claim, the only
safety requirement is that a manufacturer must be able to substanti-
ate its claim.2 5' The ambiguity rests in the fact that it is not clear how
much data a manufacturer needs to substantiate a struc-
ture/function claim sufficiently. 51 It is also unclear if the substantia-
tion has to be product specific. 52 There is no indication as to
whether the substantiation of a claim for one product indicates a
green light for a product that is the same consistency or substantially
the same consistency to make the same claim.2
The "substantiate" standard actually appears twice in DSHEA:
first, in the New Dietary Ingredients section and again in reference
to label claims.2  Neither section defines the term "substantiate,"
244. Cohen, supra note 87, at 186.
245. See McCann, supra note 4, at 248.
246. Id. at 249.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Bass & Marden, supra note 3, at 287.
250. See Sardina, supra note 14, at 129.
251. DSHEA § 343(r)(6)(B).
252. Pinco & Rubin, supra note 104, at 393.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 394.
255. Gilhooley, supra note 41, at 702.
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and FDA guidance on the topic is unclear.2 5 Therefore, manufac-
turers have again taken advantage of the vagueness of DSHEA and
the substantiation requirement by the use of inconclusive prelimi-
nary results as substantiation for structure/function claims.
157
In November of 2004, FDA announced initiatives to provide
guidance to the dietary supplement industry.5 8 Among these initia-
tives is "draft guidance" to attempt to define the level of substantia-
tion necessary to make a structure function claim while also main-
taining "flexibility in the precise amount and type of evidence that
constitutes adequate substantiation."2 9 The press release announc-
ing the initiative indicated the FDA's hope to coordinate with FTC
efforts to stamp out fraud in dietary supplement labeling. ° Chair-
man Deborah Platt Majoras added, "[t]he guidance FDA has issued
today sends a clear and strong reminder to marketers that claims
about the benefits of dietary supplements, wherever they appear,
must be truthful and substantiated by high quality scientific evi-
dence."1 ' These are strong words; however, the proposal is only
guidance and, as such, the industry is not legally obligated to follow
it.212 The draft guidance, though a step in the right direction, fails to
draw a bright line rule for manufacturers to follow.
IV. AMENDING DSHEA: PROPOSALS ON THE FLOOR OF
THE 109T CONGRESS
DSHEA was premised on the positive role of nutrition in pre-
ventative health care and supported by the recognition that con-
sumers want information and access to a "broad range of safe prod-
ucts."12 3 Yet, however pure the intent of the legislature, the fact re-
256. Guidance for Industry: Substantiation for Dietary Supplement Claims Made
Under Section 403(r)(6) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 69 Fed. Reg.
64,962 (Nov. 9, 2004)[hereinafter Guidance].
257. Pinco & Halpern, supra note 153, at 576.
258. FDA, FDA Announces Major Initiatives for Dietary Supplements (Nov. 4,
2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEWO 1130.html.
259. Guidance, supra note 256, at 64,962.
260. Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1252.
261. Guidance, supra note 256, at 64,962.
262. See generally FDA, Fact Sheet on FDA's Draft Guidance for Industry: Substantia-
tion for Dietary Supplement Claims, Nov. 4, 2004, available at
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/ dms/dsclmfs.html.
263. Bass & Marden, supra note 3, at 287.
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mains that DSHEA has not reached this goal. 2' This notion has
been recognized by lawmakers since the inception of DSHEA, as
each new Congressional session has witnessed an array of proposed
legislation, all attempting to reconcile the shortcomings of
DSHEA.
65
At the close of the 108th Congress there were three bills left on
the floor that would have affected the dietary supplement industry
and FDA regulation.2 ' Now, in the 109th congress, each of the
three bills has returned with a few changes.
One of the bills currently before the House of Representatives
is the Dietary Supplement Access and Awareness Act.267 This bill
would affect marketers of herbal dietary supplements by amending
the law in several ways.2 ' First, it would require companies to report
to the Secretary of HHS a list of their products, product labels, and
at the discretion of FDA, a quantitative listing of all ingredients.69
Second, it would mandate submission of serious adverse event re-
ports to FDA.2 7 Third, it would authorize the Secretary of HHS to
require a manufacturer to conduct post-market research, or prove a
product is not adulterated. 7'
A second bill, Consumers Access to Health Information Act,
would "permit the accurate label and labeling claims of the curative,
mitigation, treatment and prevention effects of foods and dietary
supplements on disease and health-related conditions."72  This bill
changes the expansive definition of the word disease and is hoped
to have a significant effect on structure/function claims.72
Finally, a third bill, DSHEA Full Implementation and En-
forcement Act of 2005, proposes to ensure the goals of DSHEA are
met by authorizing appropriations to fully enforce and implement
DSHEA.274 Specifically, the proposed act will meet these goals by
264. See Sardina, supra note 14, at 124 (stating that "[e]ven a principal sponsor of
DSHEA, Congressman Bill Richardson, admitted there was a need to reform
DSHEA").
265. See generally H.R. 4747, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 4760, 108th Cong. (2003);
H.R. 3811, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 3306, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 4581, 105th
Cong. (1998); H.R. 1951, 104th Cong. (1995).
266. H. R. 4760, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 4747, 108th Cong. (2003).
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increasing the ability of FDA to expand the research and develop-
ment of consumer information. 5
Each of these bills, if passed, would be a step in the right direc-
tion toward implementing DSHEA in a manner that is more likely to
create a market of safe dietary supplements and allow consumers to
access increasing amounts of accurate information. Each bill also
serves as notice that legislators are aware of DSHEA's shortcomings
and its need for amendment.7 6
A. Conceding Ground: Making Changes that will have a
Substantial Effect on DSHEA
The following discussion identifies concepts that should be in-
corporated into any future legislation that proposes to amend
DSHEA. This list is not exhaustive, however, and is limited to the
three sections of DSHEA discussed in this comment: definitions,
safety, and labeling. 7 In addition, the proposals are based in the
reality that, to be successful, an amendment must be able to satisfy
both FDA and the dietary supplement industry.7 8 These ideas in-
tend to illustrate ways that Congress can tighten the language of
DSHEA, giving FDA more regulatory power to protect Americans
and still allow the dietary supplement industry to grow. 9 These
goals can be met through changes to the definition of "dietary sup-
plement," by increasing the post-market inspection powers of FDA,
and, most importantly, by shifting the burden back to the manufac-
turers.n
1. Redefining Dietary Supplements
Before all else, DSHEA should be amended by narrowing the
definition of "dietary supplement.2 8 ' The broad definition was
275. Id.
276. See supra Section IV.
277. See infra Section IV.A.1.
278. See supra Section II.
279. Schindler, supra note 16, at 281 ("acknowledging that approximately half of
the United States population takes dietary supplements on a regular basis and
knowing the potential hazards posed by dietary supplements, Congress must grant
FDA more power to regulate the dietary supplement industry and safeguard the
public from impending disaster").
280. See infra Section IV.A.1.
281. See Sachs, supra note 195, at 696-97 (arguing that amending the definition of
a dietary supplement is vital, and while his comment takes a different approach and
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meant to encompass as many items as possible under the umbrella
of dietary supplements, so that all of the products already on the
market in 1994 would be included.n Since 1994, however, the defi-
nition of "dietary supplement" has been exploited because of its
breadth and overall lack of boundaries.283 In order to narrow the
scope of this definition, more definitions should be included.
Specifically, where the dietary supplement definition uses terms
such as "dietary substance," "ingestion," and "article," there should
be a subsequent definition of that term provided so that all readers
have a common understanding of the definition's requirements.
Dietary supplement regulation is rooted in the legal definition of
"dietary supplement," as provided by DSHEA, so most of the ambi-
guity-induced litigation has also stemmed from that definition. 8
Presumably, the legislature's purpose was to create a broad defini-
tion with an intent to create boundaries, however expansive. Those
boundaries have proven too wide and narrowing the language of
DSHEA will maintain its goals without increasing costs for current
products.87
A second proposal, linked to a lack of definition and specificity,
would require legislative action to create standards of substantia-
tion.2' FDA has provided guidance in response to the problems and
a lack of consistency with the "substantiation" standard." The is-
sued guidance, however, is unenforceable because it is not manda-
tory.' The lack of clarity concerning this standard is dangerous for
consumers and should be resolved by including required minimum
intends to use a revised definition to exclude certain groups, it is important to note
that there are many reasons that the definition should be shortened and many re-
sults that could stem from such an amendment).
282. Bass & Marden, supra note 3, at 294.
283. See Pinco & Rubin, supra note 104, at 384.
284. Onel, supra note 114, at 348 (arguing that the ambiguities within the dietary
supplement statute have already been exploited by the industry in order to best
position their products in the marketplace).
285. See generally supra Section III.-III.A.4.
286. Id
287. Presumably, this amendment would "grandfather" all current supplements,
and therefore pose no immediate costs to sellers. See generally Onel, supra note 114.
Further, the narrowing of the language would reduce the number of new products
trying to pass as dietary supplements and serve as a measure to protect consumers.
Id.
288. Margaret Gilhooley, Deregulation and the Administrative Role: Looking at Die-
tary Supplements, 62 MONT. L. REV. 85, 128 (2001)
289. See generally Burke & Page, supra note 57, at 147.
290. Id.
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standards of substantiation and examples for the industry to fol-
low.
9 1
Also, within the safety provision, FDA, in order to declare a
product unsafe, is required to show a significant risk through a bal-
ancing test.' The efforts of FDA throughout the ephedra contro-
versy, however, provide evidence that this section is unclear and un-
enforceable as written.9 Removal of unsafe products should be a
top priority of FDA and therefore, altering DSHEA so that FDA has
a clear understanding of its duty to remove products is vital.
2. Empowering FDA to Investigate Dangerous Supplements
Once the definition of "dietary supplement" becomes more
specific, it will then be important to amend the legislation so FDA
has more power to regulate the safety of products on the market
and investigate those that may be unsafe. 5 Therefore, FDA should
be given more power to react once a health threat is discovered.'
When there is a health threat, FDA should have the ability to force
an ingredient change or pull a product from the market immedi-
ately. 7 Currently, in order for FDA to remove a product, they first
must prove the product presents a significant risk and is unreasona-
bly dangerous.2 8 A proposed change of this type would result in the
291. There are two types of substantiation in DSHEA. First, in the labeling provi-
sions, manufacturers are required to be able to substantiate their claims, however,
without standards it is unclear how much substantiation is needed, and there is no
enforcement or checks on the types of substantiation being offered. See supra Sec-
tion III.C.2; The second type of substantiation is part of adulteration requirements
that, currently, FDA bears the burden of substantiating that a product bears an
unreasonable risk. This standard was discussed in the ephedra litigation, but no
ruling was ever made as to the appropriate level of substantiation. See supra Section
1I.1B.1.
292. See DSHEA § 342(f)(1)(C).
293. Sachs, supra note 195, at 689 (stating that after a decade of investigation the
FDA is still unable to answer the question of whether or not there is enough evi-
dence to prove a "significant and unreasonable risk" of ephedra products illustrates
FDA's inability to perform the oversight function DSHEA thrusts upon it).
294. See Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1273.
295. Kauflin, supra note 222, at 442 (arguing that DSHEA should be amended so
as to give FDA more investigatory power).
296. See Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1273 (arguing that "once a health threat becomes
known, [FDA] should have wide authority to require labeling changes, ingredient
changes, or total market withdrawal of the product").
297. Id.
298. See DSHEA § 342(f)(1)(D).
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faster removal of a public safety hazard and, optimistically, would
create some sense of deference for FDA.2M
Naturally, if FDA were given more power to react to a health
crisis, then DSHEA should also construct a system that brings news
of a health problem promptly to FDA. The current warning system
to tell FDA that there is a problem consists of AER, but AERs are
not mandatory for manufacturers and historically have proven to be
ineffective.'
The first step to improving this system is to require mandatory
reporting from the manufacturer.' The current system allows "bad
actors" within the dietary supplement industry to tarnish the record
of the entire industry.'2  By requiring AERs, however, consumers
and FDA would have direct knowledge of who the "bad actors" were
without passing judgment on the entire market.3 Further, manda-
tory AERs should be beneficial to manufacturers, as it would result
in a system that allows manufacturers to show off a clean record.'
Additionally, to streamline the system, an AER form should be
standardized.' ° A common form would be easily accounted for and
tracked by FDA to provide more precise data as to actual problems
with specific products and ingredients.3"
299. McCann, supra note 4, at 265-66.
300. See Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1263; see generally Sachs, supra note 175, at 698; see
generally Ziker, supra note 15.
301. McCann, supra note 4, at 265-66.
302. See Ziker, supra note 15, at 278-79 (arguing that the failure to require adverse
event reporting "does not serve to facilitate market access," it serves to discourage
market exit). Unsafe products stay on the shelf longer because consumers and FDA
do not hear about the adverse reactions. Id. at 278.
303. Ziker, supra note 15, at 278.
304. Id. at 278. "By requiring [AERs], dietary supplement manufacturers will en-
joy the privilege of market access afforded by DSHEA while earning the right to
continued market presence by helping to gather product safety information derived
from general consumer use." Id.
305. McCann, supra note 4, at 264-65 (arguing for amendments that would in-
crease communication between the dietary supplement industry, consumers, and
FDA).
306. See generally Nutracuetical v. Crawford, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (D. Utah, 2005)
rev'd sub nom. Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von Eschenbach, 459 F.3d 1033 (10th Cir.
2006) petition for cert. filed, 75 USWL 3368 (Jan. 3, 2007)(06-922). FDA spent three
years collecting adverse event reports and was still unable to collect enough infor-
mation to satisfy the burden of proof. Id. Streamlining AER retrieval will be a
valuable tool in removing unsafe products. Id, But see supra note 20 and accompa-
nying text.
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A final addition to the safety requirements would require regis-
tration of products and product ingredients prior to marketing. 7
Implementing a registration process would increase the amount of
information FDA has about products it is supposed to regulate and
allow FDA to identify problem ingredients more easily when all ad-
verse events are reported.-'
3. Shifting the Burden from FDA to the Industry
Many areas within DSHEA seem murky; however, the one facet
of DSHEA that has remained clear is the congressional intent to
increase consumer access to dietary supplements and control prod-
uct safety and efficacy.' The inability of FDA to remove ephedra
from the market demonstrates the need for legislative reform. 1
DSHEA should be amended to focus on methods that offer the
best protection for consumers."' Specifically, the burden of proving
safety of dietary supplements should rest on the industry, because,
while DSHEA has given FDA discretion in deciding which supple-
ments to challenge, its authority to remove unsafe products has
been tested and has failed. 12
Shifting the burden of proving product safety back to the
manufacturers will not be an inconvenience. 3 Research is not al-
ways prohibitively expensive, " and this should be especially true in
an industry with such tremendous recent growth and consumer
support.31 1 In addition, most dietary supplements are simply varia-
tions on a few key compounds; once the staple compounds have
been researched, the time and tests required for each marketed
307. McCann, supra note 4, at 264-65 (arguing that the absences of registration
for dietary supplement products increases safety concerns). As it stands, FDA can-
not determine ingredients for nearly one third of the supplements for which ad-
verse events are reported.. I& Further, it should not impose extra material costs to
the manufacturer, assuming that the "manufacturers are aware of their own prod-
ucts ingredients." Id at 265.
308. McCann, supra note 4, at 265 (stating that the dietary supplement industry
would receive the benefit of a continued no pre-market approval requirement in
exchange for enhanced registration and mandatory adverse event reporting).
309. Bass & Marden, supra note 3, at 287.
310. See generally supra Section III.B.1.
311. Wais supra note 8, at 851.
312. Id. at 868; see generally Nutracuetical, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1310. But see supra note
20 and accompanying text.
313. Wais, supra note 8, at 851.
314. Id. at 878.
315. See generally Gilhooley, supra note 41.
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supplement would decline."' Further, manufacturers of truly safe
products, such as vitamin C, would not be affected since there is
already copious evidence that the ingredient is safe and beneficial."'
Shifting the burden of proving safety back to the dietary sup-
plement industry is the only way for Congress to remain consistent
with its original purpose to protect consumers by controlling prod-
uct safety."' Additionally, a positive side effect of shifting the bur-
den of proving safety would be the removal of the procedural uncer-
tainty regarding standards for what is an "unreasonable risk," reliev-
ing DSHEA of some ambiguity. 9 Under the current regime, prod-
ucts with no known level of safety, but a widely known record of
deleterious effects, such as ephedra, are allowed to stay on the mar-
ket too long while FDA is trying to meet its ostensible burden.2
Until the industry can show that no dietary supplement on the mar-
ket presents a significant or unreasonable risk, consumers will not
be able to rely on dietary supplements.2 '
V. CONCLUSION
DSHEA was created to meet the needs of our society in the
early 1990s. The act delegated to the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) the needed power to regulate an industry that was grow-
ing stronger each year, and offered the dietary supplement industry
needed instruction and guidance, so that it could continue to de-
velop within the boundaries of the law.322 The legislation was written
and passed unanimously in one year, and successfully provided a
framework to support the burgeoning industry. 23 This hurried leg-
islation, however, was unprepared for the repercussions its ambigu-
ous language would create.324 Although DSHEA removed much of
FDA's power to regulate dietary supplements, it would not be fair to
say the fight has ended. Since the enactment of DSHEA in 1994,
FDA has acted with determination; and even where the agency has
not been successful, the failures have become pedestals on which
316. Wais, supra note 8, at 878.
317. Id. at 851.
318. Id at 878.
319. Id. at 879.
320. Id. at 851.
321. Wais, supra note 8, at 870.
322. See supra Section II.
323. Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1260-61.
324. See generally Section III.
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DSHEA critics stand and pronounce that change is necessary and
imminent.
